This paper analyzes competition in a two-period differentiated-products duopoly in the presence of both switching costs and network effects. Consumers are assumed to have rational expectation about network sizes, and future prices. The equilibrium prices in both periods are lower than markets with just switching costs and they decrease with the magnitude of network effects. Hence, in any period they might fall below the price level in a market without switching costs and network effects. * We would like to thank Volkswagen Stiftung for the generous financial support which made this research possible. All errors are ours.
Introduction
the cases where market is covered and shared in each period. The market is shared only when network effects are sufficiently low. We find that the introduction of network effects decreases the equilibrium prices in both first and second periods relative to a model with only switching costs. The competition becomes fiercer when network benefits get stronger what might even lead the prices to fall below those in a market without switching costs and network effects.
In section 1, we present a brief review of literature on network effects and switching costs.
We introduce the model in section 2, and derive the equilibrium in section 3. We discuss the properties of the equilibrium in section 4, and section 5 concludes.
Literature review
There is a large body of literature analyzing competition in markets with network effects. In their seminal paper, Katz and Shapiro (1985) develop a static oligopoly Cournot model of competition with network effects. In the presence of network effects consumers have to form expectations about the network sizes before they decide to buy and before firms decide about the quantities supplied. Hence, different sets of expectations lead to different equilibria. In the model, they restrict attention to expectations which are fulfilled in equilibrium. Even fulfilled expectations might lead to multiple equilibria. The equilibrium prices tend to increase in the expected network sizes. Furthermore, they examine equilibrium outcomes under different levels of compatibility as well as the private and social incentives for achieving compatibility. A unique symmetric equilibrium exists only for full compatibility. In other cases both symmetric and asymmetric equilibria might exist. In the asymmetric equilibrium firms differ only in consumers' expectations about network sizes.
In a later paper, Katz and Shapiro (1986) examine dynamic duopoly competition with network effects. However, they focus their attention on the impact of technology sponsorship on the market outcome. They point out situations in which lack of sponsorship or the sponsorship of one or even both competing technologies causes market inefficiencies. Katz and Shapiro (1994) present an excellent survey on markets with network effects.
We mention just a few related studies from the literature examining the competition when consumers have switching costs. 1 Our model builds on which analyzes competition in a two-period duopoly when there are switching costs. He finds that the existence of switching costs may make the market less competitive in both periods. The firm with a larger user base tends to exploit locked in consumers and charges higher prices in the second period.
Thus, the smaller firm may target the cohort of new consumers. However, rational consumers are aware that they will be locked in in the second period and that larger market share implies higher prices. Hence, the demand is less elastic in prices in both periods and firms may sustain higher prices. Farrell and Shapiro (1988) analyze infinite-period overlapping-generations model of duopolistic competition when consumers have switching costs. Similar to , when firms cannot differentiate among consumers, the larger firm prefers to charge higher prices and serve the old consumers while smaller firm targets new consumers with lower prices. Moreover, when price announcements are modelled endogenously, in the equilibrium the incumbent declares its prices first. They conclude, that switching costs do not create entry barriers but in fact encourage entry, even when it is socially inefficient. However, in the presence of economies of scale or network effects the incumbent may be able to exclude potential entrants.
Also Beggs and Klemperer (1992) consider a multi-period duopoly model with switching costs. In this model firms choose prices simultaneously. They conclude, that the equilibrium prices and profits are higher than in a market without switching costs. This paper is motivated by the lack of analysis considering competition in markets with network effects when consumers have switching costs. Despite the obvious shortcomings of the two-period framework, we will extend the model examined in by amending a network benefit to consumers' valuation of the products. We hope to return to the multi-period 1 For further reference, Klemperer (1995) is an excellent survey on competition in markets with switching costs. framework in future research.
Consumers are assumed to have rational expectations about equilibrium current and future quantities and future prices. Thus, they are able to predict correctly the prices in the second period and based on them deduce the network sizes in equilibrium. We also assume complete incompatibility of networks, both technologies are sponsored and have equal production costs.
Moreover, the consumers have to purchase in each period and benefit only from the network size in the current period.
The Model
We consider consumers with reservation price r, who are heterogeneous with respect to their tastes for each brand. This heterogeneity is captured by means of Hotelling horizontal differ- In each period consumers purchase exactly one technology and they cease to exist after second period. The reservation price r is set high enough to ensure that all consumers on the market buy as soon as they arrive. It is the same for both products and all consumers in any period.
A group of old consumers ν leaves the market after the first period and is exchanged by a cohort of new consumers exactly of the same size of ν, so that the market size remains constant in time. New consumers have locations which are also uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 1] . Another group of old consumers µ have changing tastes in the second period. They are redistributed uniformly in the [0, 1] interval, independent on which product they bought in the first period. The rest of the old population of size 1 − ν − µ remain in their initial locations.
Consumers cannot foresee earlier to which group they will belong in the next period. When a consumer, who remains in the market in the second period, wishes to change her brand of choice, she faces a switching cost. All consumers with changing preferences have switching costs denoted by s L while those with unchanging preferences face a switching cost of s H . We assume that s H s L , thus consumers with unchanging preferences are likely to be locked-in as long as the price differences are not too large. This assumption could be justified by noting that consumers who have changing preferences are likely to be more flexible and find it much easier to learn using new products.
At the same time, both technologies exhibit network effects, which means that the consumers' utility of a particular technology is positively influenced by its expected network size. The technologies are incompatible with each other, so that the network benefits depend only on the expected installed base of own technology in current period. We assume linear network benefits with a magnitude k, which is equal in both periods, for both technologies and all consumers.
Because the demand is resolved after prices are announced, the network sizes can only be known in expectations. In the model, consumers have rational expectations about the network sizes in each period. This implies, that consumers are able to predict correctly the network sizes in both periods given the prices, but also expectations about prices turn out to be correct.
The expected network sizes in the first period depend on the first period prices and expected second period prices, while second period network sizes depend on second period prices and first period installed base. Firm set their prices considering the way consumers from expectations.
In the equilibrium the expectations about prices and network sizes turn out to be correct. When consumers make the purchase decisions in the first period, they incorporate the influence of their decision and first period network sizes on their second period utility. The total utility is the discounted sum of per period utilities, with a discount factor of β common to all.
On the supply side, firms simultaneously choose prices to maximize their own two-period profits, whereby the second period profit is discounted with the same factor β-same as for the consumers. The firms cannot differentiate among old locked-in and new consumers and charge equal prices to all of them. Moreover, we assume firms have zero fix costs as well as common constant marginal costs which are also normalized to zero.
The Two-Period Game
In the derivation of demands, we made certain behavioral assumptions. First, market is shared and covered each period. Second, some consumers with changing preferences switch in the second period, while the consumers with constant preferences remain with the brand they have chosen in the first period. For these assumptions to be relevant, the parameters of the model have to satisfy certain conditions. In the following, we first derive the equilibrium outcome assuming that these conditions are met, and then provide restrictions on the parameters to indeed satisfy these conditions.
The Second Period
We start solving the two-period game by finding the second period equilibrium solution.
The existence of switching costs implies that the second period utilities of old consumers depend on their first period technology choices. For the fraction of consumers with changing preferences µ who purchased technology A in the first period, the utility of buying technology A again can be expressed as:
where p A 2 is the second period price of technology A, x A 2 is the second period location of the consumer and
represents the expected second period network size of technology A, which depends on the second period prices and the first period installed base. The utility of buying technology B in the second period conditional on the choice of technology A in the first period can be expressed as: and U 2 B|B , can be derived similarly.
By finding the indifferent consumers, the conditional demand functions for each technology generated can be derived for the consumers with changing preferences. Thus, the second period demand function for technology A, conditional on the purchase of technology A in the first period, has formulation:
This demand function represents the fraction of consumers with varying preferences who buy technology A in both periods. The demand function for technology A conditional on buying B in the first period can be written as:
Observe, that for sufficiently large reservation price r the market is covered in both periods,
. We require these functions to be well defined, hence within the [0,1] interval. Moreover, we want at least one consumer with varying preferences to change technology from A to B in the next period (and the opposite). The necessary conditions on parameters are derived in the Appendix.
The cohort of new consumer ν has no switching costs in the second period. With this exception, their second period utilities have exactly the same formulation like the old consumers with varying preferences. Thus, the second period demand for technology A generated by the group of new consumers is equal to:
with
representing the demand function for technology B. Both demand functions must be well defined within the [0,1] interval. Moreover, we also assume that new consumers buy from both firms, that is market is shared for this segment of consumers. The necessary conditions on parameters for this to be possible are derived in the Appendix.
Finally, the fraction of consumers with unchanged preferences (1 − ν − µ) will choose in the second period exactly the same technology as before, since their switching cost s H is assumed to be sufficiently high.
Therefore, the total second period demands for technology A and B may be expressed as:
and
Rational expectations on network sizes mean that
, and similarly for technology B. Using this restriction in both (4) and (5), the unconditional rational expectations demands for technologies A and B in the second period may be written as
Notice that, for these demand functions to be downward sloping in own prices we need t − kµ − kν > 0, that is the network benefits must be small relatively to the transportation costs or the share of consumers with stable preferences must be relatively high.
To simplify the demand functions, define
Using these expressions, the demands (6) and (7) may be rewritten as
Given that the fixed and marginal costs are normalized to zero, the profit functions of the firms are simply their revenues and given by
. Both profit functions are concave in own price since demands are linear. Solving the FOCs, therefore, is sufficient to derive the second period Nash equilibrium prices. For the equilibrium solution to be valid we have to derive restrictions on parameters. We define following intervals of switching costs (see Appendix for the derivation)
and the space of parameters
Lemma 1 In the parameter space P, the second period Nash equilibrium prices are given by
the equilibrium demands are given by
and the equilibrium profits are
where I = {A, B}.
Proof. Straightforward solution of simultaneous equations. See the Appendix for the derivation of the parameter space P.
When t − kµ − kν > 0, both A and B are positive. Hence, the firm with larger first period user base is able to charge higher price in the second period and earns higher profits. As first period market shares are valuable, firms are likely to employ strategies to gain higher market shares in the first period. The restrictions on parameter values to the space P are necessary to assure that the behavioral assumptions are fulfilled. In the parameter space P, the second period demands (13) are well defined within the (0,1) interval.
The First Period
In the first period, rational consumers choose a technology considering the utility they will derive in both periods:
The discounted second period utility is an expected utility dependent on whether consumers will be present on the market in the second period and if so, which technology they will purchased. In the first period consumers cannot foresee to which group they will belong afterwards.
With probability µ they will be in the group with changing preferences. Hence, they will be redistributed uniformly in the [0,1] interval in the second period. In this case the expected second period utility would be
)dx A 2 for consumers buying technology A in the first period and
)dx B 2 for technology B. With probability ν they will leave the market, so that their second period utility would equal to zero. Finally, with probability 1 − µ − ν they will belong to the group with constant preferences in the second period and keep buying the same technology in the second period.
We equate the utilities (15) and (16) and substitute the second period equilibrium prices (12) as well as that rational expectations condition
, to derive the first period demands being functions of the first period prices only:
where
The demand functions are decreasing in own prices only if F > 0. It is very difficult to derive the full set of restrictions on the parameters for which this condition is fulfilled. However, we may point out the sufficient conditions, namely µ + ν < 2 3 and k ≤ t, and restrict attention only to these parameter ranges. It might be easily checked that for µ + ν < 2 3 and k < t we get kB − 1 < 0, what implies F > 0. We combine the parameter space P with the conditions sufficient for F > 0 to get restricted parameter space
The two-periods profit functions may be written as
by using the second period equilibrium profits given in (14). A simple inspection will reveal that both profits functions are concave in own prices. Thus, solving simultaneously the FOCs provides symmetric first period equilibrium prices.
Lemma 2 In the parameter space R, the first period Nash equilibrium prices are symmetric and given by
Thus, the equilibrium first period demands turn out to be
Given the first period outcome, the second period equilibrium prices are also symmetric and given
and the equilibrium demands in the second period also turn out be
Proof. Straightforward solution of simultaneous equations.
Basically, the equilibrium prices in any period could be negative. However, in the case of negative prices, the two-period profits must be non-negative. The total two-period profits are symmetric and may be written as:
Thus, for the two-period equilibrium solutions to hold, the demand functions must be well defined (as in the parameter space R) and two-period profits must be non-negative. See Appendix for the derivation of necessary conditions on parameters.
Let P SC+N E be the equilibrium prices in the presence of both switching costs and network effects, P N E be the equilibrium price when only network effects exist, and P SC be the equilibrium price with just switching costs and P be the equilibrium price without switching costs and network effects.
Proposition 1 (Price Orders)
The second period equilibrium prices might be ordered in two ways:
• Low network benefits:
• High network benefits:
The first period equilibrium prices must fulfill two conditions:
• P SC
1

> P
SC+N E 1
Proof. Straightforward.
The Results
The equilibrium prices in both first (19) and second period (21) lie below the price level on the market with switching costs only. Thus, the presence of network effects makes the competition fiercer in both periods. The equilibrium prices decrease in network benefits. Formally, the first period price decreases since
while the second period price decreases linearly ∂p 2 ∂k = −1. Therefore, for adequately strong network benefits the prices in both periods could fall below the price level in markets without network benefits and switching costs.
In the markets with switching costs only, firms were able to sustain high prices in equilibrium at least in the second period. In the first period, according to the results of prices could be both above and below the price level on the market without switching costs. This is true because the rational consumers expect the first period market leader to charge higher prices in the later stages, what reduces their sensitivity to price decreases in the first period.
In the presence of network benefits, consumers value large networks more. The higher market share in the first period allows to utilize more locked-in consumers in the second period, but also promises competitive advantage in the second period. Therefore, the first period installed base has even more value and the competition is fiercer than in the markets with switching costs only. However, the rational consumers again take the potential second period market power into account. Thus, like in , the first period demand is less elastic and might result in prices above the price level in the market without switching costs and network benefits.
In the second period firms utilize locked in consumers and charge higher prices. Thus, for higher fraction of consumers with unchanged preference (1−µ−ν), the second period equilibrium price is rising. The firms know, that these consumers will not change the technology because of very high switching costs. However, the presence of network effects makes them to compete fiercer for new unattached consumers. Therefore, the prices are below the level with switching costs only and for sufficiently large network benefits could fall below the price level in markets without network effects and switching costs. Possibly, equilibrium prices below the price level in markets without network benefits and switching costs could be sustained in both periods.
The first period prices are quadratic functions of switching costs, they could be both decreasing and increasing in the switching costs value for some constellations of network benefits and switching costs. The second period prices do not directly depend on the strength of switching costs. They are positively influenced by the fraction of consumers with unchanged preferences who has very high switching costs s H .
Conclusions
We have analyzed the two-period model of duopolistic competition with switching costs and network effects, built on the model of . We assumed consumers to have rational expectations about the prices and network sizes. Hence, we were able to fill the gap in the literature and provide some conclusions about competition on the markets, where switching costs and network effects coexist.
The first period equilibrium price on the market with switching costs and network benefits may be both above and below the price level on the market without them. However, this price will be always below the price level in a market with just switching costs. The first period price decreases in the magnitude of network benefits and for adequately large network benefits could fall below the price level without switching costs and network effects. Moreover, the first period equilibrium price might be both decreasing and increasing in the magnitude of switching costs, depending on the parameter ranges of both network benefits and switching costs.
The existence of network benefits, like in the first period, makes the second period competition fiercer than in the market with switching costs only. The equilibrium price is decreasing in the strength of network benefits. Thus, for adequately large network effects, it could fall below the price level on the market without switching costs and network benefits. Therefore, the negative impact of network benefits on the equilibrium prices might be much stronger than the positive impact of switching costs. The second period equilibrium prices do not depend directly on the magnitude of switching costs but on how large is the fraction of consumers with constant preferences. The second period prices rise with the size of the group of locked-in consumers.
The market outcome in both periods in the presence of both switching costs and network effects is definitely more competitive than in the case with just switching costs. For adequately large network benefits the competition could be even fiercer than in a market without switching costs and network effects. This indicates, that the regulation should in first line try to reduce or eliminate switching costs, which are responsible for sustaining high market prices.
Appendix Proof of Lemma 1
The equilibrium solution holds only for certain ranges of parameter values. We may restrict attention to the case when network benefits are weak relatively to the perceived product differentiation, that is t − kµ − kν > 0. This condition implies positive A and B. Hence, the second period demand functions (13) decrease in own prices and the second period prices (12) are positive. Moreover, for the first period demands to decrease in own prices we need F > 0. The derivation of the full range of parameters for this condition to be fulfilled is rather difficult. Hence, we will restrict attention to the sufficient conditions µ + ν < 2 3 and k < t, which implies k ∈ [0, 2 3 t µ+ν ) together with kB − 1 < 0. The second period demand for each technology consists of three components: the demand of new consumers, the demand of consumers with changing preferences and demand of consumers with constant preferences. We have to assure that all these demands are well defined, that is have values within the [0, 1] interval. Moreover, we assume that consumers with constant preferences do not switch. However, we want switching costs to be low enough for at least one consumer with changing preferences who bought technology A to switch to technology B in the second period and at least one consumer of B to switch to technology A (what implies that demands are within (0, 1) interval). Moreover, we want the new consumers to share the market. Two cases must be considered:
First case: kB − 1 < 0 In this case we have k ∈ [0, 2 3 t µ+ν ). We want at least one new consumer in the second period to buy technology A and technology B. By substituting the second period equilibrium demands (13) and prices (12) into the new consumer demand specifications (3) we get the new consumers' demand for technology A, and from the assumption D 
